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(b)(3)-18 USC 798
(b)(3)-50 USC 403
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~~TOP SECRET//COMINT~~ [REDACTED]

Talking points for discussions [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Right up front, I want to the extraordinary work done by people here at NSA at great personal sacrifice to keep the nation safe from terrorists. That was the sentiment expressed by the President in his meeting with top national security aides [REDACTED]. He knows how hard the CT mission is and is very much aware of your sacrifices.

[REDACTED]

It is hard to watch the public debate on this issue knowing how much NSA contributes to the mission on a daily basis. We constantly deliver unique insights and breakthrough capability. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Dated: 20070108

Declassify On: 20350101

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~~TOP SECRET//COMINT~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//COMINT~~ [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//COMINT~~ [REDACTED]

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These are sobering findings.

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
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
~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//~~ [REDACTED]



What do I want you to do with all this? First, I want to encourage a bit of introspection – what does NSA need to do better to make sure [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The people working SIGINT and CT may feel embattled, [REDACTED] taking our national counterterrorism capability to the next level. That's your attention should be as well.

At NSA, we are pushing ahead on several fronts:



~~TOP SECRET//COMINT//~~ [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET//COMINT//~~ [REDACTED]

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~~SECRET//COMINT//~~ [REDACTED]


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


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
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


Those working the CT mission at NSA continue to perform at an exceptional level and need our support and action.

The margins are terribly thin between having enough insights [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The leadership and management at NSA need to ensure the tools they need to do their jobs are provided. The insights the workforce has into new opportunities or existing impediments needs to be capitalized on.

Keep asking yourselves: what do we need to do [REDACTED]



~~TOP SECRET//COMINT~~ [REDACTED]

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


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UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**Chief Technology Officer (CTO) Talking Points****Establishing CTO Directly Supports NSA Strategic Plan**

Dominate global cryptology; ... secure national security systems; ... connect people, sensors, systems and information on a global scale; ... and leverage our unique relationships with government, industry, academia, and foreign partners.

--NSA Strategic Plan, June 2006

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Establishing CTO Directly Supports NSA Mission ObjectivesA large rectangular box with a black border, completely empty, indicating redacted content.**Establishing CTO is Consistent with NSA's Priorities**A large rectangular box with a black border, completely empty, indicating redacted content.**Who says this is the right thing to do?**A large rectangular box with a black border, completely empty, indicating redacted content.UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

CTO Functions


Investment Banker for Technology

- Controls technology capital investment resources – pay and non-pay
- Agency development and deployment are aligned with just one atomic “cost center” per “project” with mapping of capital and personnel time to each


Technology Manager

- Maintains Agency Enterprise Architecture and ensures compliance
- CTO organizationally owns development and deployment effort not in mission elements
- CTO oversees all development and deployment effort for efficiency, effectiveness, and compliance with Enterprise Architecture

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


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**What Activities Go into CTO-owned Organization?****What Activities are Under CTO Oversight and Control?**

Beyond activities under CTO direct organizational leadership, oversight and control extends to *ALL* technology development and deployment.

- These activities are principally those which are very highly coupled with ongoing mission operations.

What Activities do NOT Go into CTO?**What is really going on here?**

- We're aligning all like-kind technology development activity under a single authority
 - Key! Empowering CTO to wring out efficiencies
 - Key! CTO working with SAIT will achieve increased efficiency through prioritized capital investment
- We're giving the CTO comprehensive financial authority -- and tools -- to effectively execute modernization and transformational objectives
 - Key! Binning activity and people and money into atomic manageable units, "projects"
 - Key! (Beginning to) address people as a managed input and not just money
 - Key! Separating capital (investment) from expense (operations) funding
- We're pursuing an Enterprise Architecture from which we are deriving detailed development and deployment objectives
 - Key! We're aligning all technology efforts around a single comprehensive vision
 - Key! Performance will be measured

Why will this work?

CTO will be given the necessary resources, authority and visibility.

- Direct report to DIRNSA
- Membership on SLT
- Membership on SAIT
- Financial control over ALL capital funds and personnel involved in development and deployment

Entire Agency Leadership Team will have a stake in success

- Will create "shared accountability" by implementing single set of Management Baseline Objectives (MBO) for entire SLT.
- We will tie pay incentives to MBOs

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TALKING POINTS FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERS TO USE ON
TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM

The terrorist threat to this country is real. We need to do everything possible to make our nation safe, and we need to do it in a way that preserves our civil liberties.

As a member of an intelligence committee of Congress, I am fully committed to that goal. We are the watchdogs of the Intelligence Community, including the National Security Agency that is carrying out the Terrorist Surveillance Program.

I have been briefed on the Program and stood on the operations floor at NSA to see first-hand how vital it is to the security of our country and how carefully it is being run.

It would be irresponsible to reveal details because that would give our adversaries an advantage. My colleagues and I are very serious about protecting our nation's secrets.

I can say that the Program must continue. It has detected terrorist plots that could have resulted in death or injury to Americans both at home and abroad.

It is being run in a highly disciplined way that takes great pains to protect U.S. privacy rights. There is strict oversight in place, both at NSA and outside, now including the full congressional intelligence committees.

The Program is not "data mining"; it targets only international communications closely connected to al Qa'ida or an affiliated group.

I have personally met the dedicated men and women of NSA. The country owes them an enormous debt of gratitude for their superb efforts to keep us all secure.

Current law is not agile enough to handle the threat posed by sophisticated international terrorist organizations such as al Qa'ida. This is because the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, or "FISA," has not kept pace with communications technology and was not designed for the types of threats we now face.

Today, in part because of technological changes over the last 30 years, the FISA frequently requires judicial authority to collect the communications of non-U.S. persons outside the United States. This clogs the FISA process with applications for court orders that have little to do with protecting U.S. privacy rights.

The FISA should be amended so that it is technology neutral. This would return it to its original purpose of focusing FISA privacy protections on Americans in the United States. It would greatly improve the FISA process and relieve the massive amounts of resources currently being consumed.

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White House Talking Points

The President is committed to protecting the privacy rights of all US citizens.

In April 2007, a former US Army linguist wrote a letter to Senator Leahy with several allegations about matters that took place during her time on active duty at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

Senator Leahy referred this letter to the Defense Department.

The NSA IG conducted an inquiry into one of the allegations that the Army linguist made and did not find a violation in laws or procedures related to that allegation. A report on the inquiry was provided to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees. The Army IG has an on-going investigation into the other allegations the linguist has made.

Additional allegations made by a former Navy linguist stationed at Ft. Gordon, Georgia appeared in recent press reporting. Those allegations, heard for the first time in these media accounts, are currently under investigation by the NSA Inspector General.

The President's Oversight Board has been monitoring the issue and will make appropriate recommendations, if needed, to the President.

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Talking points for D/DIR

Commander's Cyber Readiness Inspection (CCRI)

30 August 2010

- Welcome/thank you for coming. We continually strive to improve our security posture and the DISA CCRI here at NSA will help identify further areas of improvement on our NIPRNet and SIPRNet networks.
- We consider the security of our Information Technology systems and network to be as important as our SIGINT and IA missions at NSA/CSS. These networks are critical to mission success; assessing and managing the risk are key practices to optimal performance.
- NSA is constantly improving our processes and practices to protect and/or defend our IT infrastructure

- Some current initiatives on NSANet include
 - NSA IA Gold Standard (Operations, Governance, & Corporate Culture)
 - Streamlined and modernized Security Authorization (*formerly called C&A*) processes and applying the new Risk Management Framework (RMF) across the NSA enterprise

- Threat-based risk assessments and risk management
- This audit is an opportunity for us to further improve our IA posture, particularly at our Secret and Unclassified levels. We thank you for the independent review.
- We are committed to making further improvements based on your recommendations.

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Talking Points

Information Being Declassified In "Attack on a SIGINT Collector":

Decision to Deploy the Liberty:

-During May and early June 1967, the US SIGINT organization performed moderately well with its existing ground and air collection in producing COMINT responsive to requirements, particularly those relating to the UAR and to merchant shipping.

-NSA considered the categories of Middle East communications for which the existing collection organization was either inadequate or for which it offered small promise for sustained intercept.

-For consistent, close-in intercept, SIGINT specialists decided that the assignment of a collection ship to work offshore from the UAR was in order.

-A technical research ship (TRS) was, according to one estimate at the time, the equivalent of 13 airborne collectors.

-NSA chose the Liberty because she had superior speed (18 knots vs. 8 knots for Valdez), and because her VHF/UHF multichannel collection capability was better.

Deployment to the Mediterranean:

-Liberty had undertaken five separate missions off the west coast of Africa. The ship had executed a number of difficult tasks - locating new communications.

Liberty's Modus Operandi:

-The ship's Captain had the clearances needed for access to the Research Department, visited the department daily, received briefings and reviewed the "special traffic" available there.

-SIGINT collection positions included one for direction finding, 17 for radiotelephone, 20 for manual morse, 7 for automatic morse, 7 for electronic countermeasures, and 33 for non-morse search and development, the latter for frequencies both above and below 30 Mhz.

-Six Arabic linguists joined USN-855 for the expected work on UAR communications. Three of the Arab linguists, NSA civilians Allen M. Blue, Donald K. Blalock, and Robert L. Wilson were among the specialists who came on board, the remaining linguists being NSG specialists. The NSA linguists brought with them selected technical material. Assignment of civilian linguists to work on board a US Navy

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ship was not unusual. On TRS deployments along the African coastlines, civilian linguists had worked alongside the military linguists, who at times were not available in sufficient number of the missions at hand.

-NSA action officers established a telecon with USN-855 on 1 June in order to confirm the arrival of the personnel, special equipment and technical materials needed in the eastern Mediterranean. In order to assist USN-855's reporting and transcribing functions, NSA had previously arranged with.....(remainder redacted).

...USN-855's collection mission, SIGINT managers had designated five operational areas numbered west to east in the eastern Mediterranean near the coastline of the U.A.R., Israel, Lebanon and Syria, each measuring about 50-by-50 miles. In proposing the five operational areas to JSC, the Director, NSA had indicated his preference, base on wave propagation analysis of U.A.R. communications for operational area three (32:00-33:00N to 34:00E) if operational and safety factors did not dictate otherwise.

Enroute to Operational Area 3

-NSA had outlined the mission for the Liberty during its voyage to the eastern Mediterranean, the changing geographical and hearability considerations to govern specific collection activity during the trip. The Director, NSA designated USN-855 positions for search and development of Moroccans HF, VHF, UHF, and radioprinter communications and Algerian HF, VHF, and possible VHF multichannel communications. USN-855 was to forward by electrical transmission technical summaries of Moroccan and Algerian communications to NSA, with information copies going to (redacted) and courier delivery of tapes and traffic to NSA's Middle East Office, G6.

-Following the North African coastline, its collection positions were on the prescribed Algerian and Moroccan communications. Orientation and training for the main objective, U.A.R. communications, detracted somewhat from performance on the secondary Algerian and Moroccan assignments, but this was to be expected.

-Studying the successful Israeli drive unto the U.A.R. territory, the Director, NSA decided that the Liberty's opportunity for effective collection of U.A.R. communications might best take place in operational area two to the west of the originally specified area three.

Israeli Helicopter Conversations:

-Back at NSA, within an hour of learning the Liberty had been torpedoed, the Director, NSA sent a message to all ____ (redacted - not further

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identified) intercept sites requesting a special search for all communications that might reflect the attack or reaction. No communications of the attacking aircraft or torpedo boats were available. However, one of the airborne platforms ...(redacted) had collected voice conversations between two Israeli helicopter pilots and the control tower at Hazor Airfield (near Tel Aviv). Control told helicopter 815 at 1431 hours that "there is a warship there which we attacked. The men jumped into the water from it. You will try to rescue them." Although there were other references to a search for the men in the water, no personnel from the Liberty had jumped overboard. At 1434 hours, the control tower told helicopter 815 that the ship was Egyptian and that he could return home. At 1510 hours, the controller asked 815 to identify the nationality of any survivors. Subsequently, the helicopter pilot reported seeing an American flag on the ship. In another portion of the conversation, the pilot of helicopter 815 reported that number GTR-5 was written on the ship's side and that behind the ship were several uninflated life boats. At 1521 hours the helicopters were instructed to return home.

Replacement Inquiries:

-At approximately 1300 (8 June), The Director, Naval Security Group Europe sent a message to the America and the Little Rock requesting the status of Arabic linguists (civilian and military) aboard the Liberty for possible transfer to the USS Belmont, another technical research ship just arrived in Norfolk, Virginia, for repairs. Three hours later, at

1555.....replied to this inquiry. The only remaining Arabic linguist aboard the Liberty was Robert L. Wilson (NSA civilian); all others were wounded (and evacuated), killed, or missing.

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